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IN GENERAL
It is more than a decade now since the Administrative Law Com-
mission created by the 94th General Assembly (1941), made its study
in Ohio of the need for uniform procedures in the adoption of rules
by administrative officers, boards, commissions and other authorities
and uniform procedures for the issuance, rejection, suspension, and
revocation of licenses by state officers and agencies. The results of
the studies made by the Administrative Law Commission were in the
main adopted by the 95th General Assembly (1943) in the enactment
of the Administrative Procedure Act.1 With the enactment of that law,
the Administrative Law Commission was continued by the legislature
for the purpose of making a study of the operation of the law. The
commission made its report and recommendations to the 96th General
Assembly (1945) which, acting upon the recommendations of the
commission, made various amendments to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.2 Since 1945, the legislature has amended the Act3 only
once and that was as the result of the decision of the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the case of Farrand v. State Medical Board.4 The court had
there held that an appeal, pursuant to Section 154-73 of the General
Code, to the court of common pleas from an order issued by an ad-
ministrative authority in the revocation of a license was not a hear-
ing de novo and that the reviewing court could not substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative authority. In short, the review
then provided by the Act was one to determine "whether the rights of
the parties have been determined by the administrative agency in
accordance with the statutes appropriate to the proceeding .... "
Findings of fact were seemingly to be accorded complete administra-
*Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, 1931-37 (Counsel for Department of In-
dustrial Relations, Ohio Beer Commission, Board of Liquor Control, and others);
formerly on Ohio State Bar Association Administrative Law Committee.
1 OHio GEN. CODE § 154-61 et seq.
2 121 LAWs oF OHIO 578 (1945).
3 OHIo GEN. CODE § 154-73.
4 151 Ohio St. 222,85 N.E. 113 (1949).
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tive finality. The effect of the amendment was to adopt the test of
"substantial evidence on the whole record."5
The question arises as to whether -the enactment of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act has been helpful and whether it has achieved its
primary purpose of assuring applicants for licenses and licensees ad-
ministrative fair play and justice.6 If nothing else, the Act has ac-
complished one beneficial result and that is the restraining influence
it has had on licensing and rule making authorities from acting in
tyrannical, arrogant, and ruthless ways. The Act has been a check on
the usurpation of power and its improper exercise by administrative
authority. The fact that the rule making and licensing power of state
administrative officers and agencies is subject to judicial review has
caused most agencies to adhere more closely in the exercise of their
powers to the basic laws relating to the agencies, as well as the uni-
form procedures set forth in the Act.
REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE
The rule making procedures outlined in the Act in the main are
in clear and understandable language. The question that arises most
often is how far may a rule making authority under Section 154-64 of
the General Code depart or deviate from the subject matter of the
public notice of a hearing of a proposed regulation. That is, can the
rule making authority after the publication of the notice of a public
hearing on a proposed rule, amendment of a rule, or the repeal of a
rule, after the public hearing depart from the stated objective of the
public notice and adopt a regulation entirely different in its effect and
scope.
That the provisions of Section 154-64 of the General Code were
intended to be a brake on rule making power is evident from the
language contained therein. It was the purpose and aim of the legis-
lature to give every person affected by or subject to a rule, the oppor-
tunity to be heard, before the rule was adopted, amended or repealed.
To say that a proposed rule after public hearing can be amended
or changed so that it is different in scope than the proposed rule,
5 OHIO GEN. CODE § 154-73 provides ". . . the court may affirm the order of
the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire
record and such other evidence as the court may have admitted, that the order is
supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in accordance with
law." To compare the federal rule on scope of judicial review of administrative find-
ings of fact, see Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 US.
479 (1951).
6 For a discussion of the similar principles and objectives of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), see Stason, The Model State Administrative
Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REV. 196 (1948).
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would allow rule making authorities to evade the very procedural
safeguards set up in Section 154-64 of the General Code in the adop-
tion, amendment, or repeal of rules and would be subject to consider-
able abuse.
It is a debatable question as to what change in wording made by
a rule making authority after holding a public hearing is consistent
with the public notice pertaining to the rule. For example, if an
agency proposes to amend a rule and then after the public hearing
decides to repeal the existing rule instead of amending it, would such
action be consistent with the public notice? Many lawyers contend
that such a deviation would not be consistent with the public notice
and would be beyond the power of the rule making body and con-
trary to Section 154-64 of the General Code. Recently, the Court of
Common Pleas of Franklin county in the unreported case of Jacobson
v. Board of Liquor Control7 struck down Amended Regulation 43
adopted by the Board of Liquor Control on March 21, 1952, because
the regulation as adopted was inconsistent with the public notice of
the proposed amendment of the rule in that it was more restrictive in
scope than the text of the proposed regulation as filed with the Secretary
of State and as contained in the public notice of the hearing on the
proposed rule. The court in substance held that a rule as finally
adopted must be consistent with the specific subject matter contained
in a proposed amendment as advertised in the public notice of the
hearing and as filed with the Secretary of State and not with the gen-
eral subject matter of the regulation.
PUBLICATION OF RuLEs
A glaring shortcoming of the Administrative Procedure Act is
that there is no official published registry for rules and regulations that
are adopted by rule making authorities. Even though the Act makes
filing of the rules with the Secretary of State necessary in order for
them to become effective and requires this official to maintain a file
of such rules open for public inspection,8 the text of the rules should
be made more easily accessible to those whose conduct they govern.
The Act should be amended so as to require the Secretary of State to
publish and issue bi-monthly a bulletin or report listing the full text
of any proposed rule, amendment or recission of a rule filed with
the Secretary of State by any authority, and the date and place of the
7 Case No. 184,885 (Nov. 10, 1952).
s OHio GEN. CODE § 154-75; Cf. MODEL STATE ADMINIsMATT PROCEDURE Acr
§4 (1946).
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public hearing thereon.9 The Secretary of State should also be re-
quired to publish the result of the action taken by the rule making
body. In addition, the Secretary of State should be required to furnish
to the clerk of the common pleas court in each county, the full text
of any proposed rule, amendment or recission of a rule filed with the
Secretary of State at least one week after the same has been filed with
that state official. The Secretary of State should also be required to
furnish to the clerk of the courts of common pleas the full text of the
rule, amendment, or recission of a rule after it has been filed by the
rule making agency with the Secretary of State. A registry of all rules,
amendments, and recissions thereof should be maintained by the clerks
of the courts of common pleas. In any county where there is an of-
ficial or recognized court reporting publication it should be required
to carry at least a synopsis of a proposed rule and the date and place
of public hearing thereon.
PERSONNEL
An obvious shortcoming in the Administrative Procedure Act re-
lates to the qualifications of the personnel of the various state authori-
ties hearing appeals from rejections of applications for permits or
citations to show cause why permits should not be suspended or re-
voked. In the rejection of applications for permits and the suspension
and revocation of licenses, the administrative authority or adjudica-
tory body is required to pass upon .the admissibility of evidence and
also make orders which are supported by reliable, probative, and sub-
stantial evidence in the whole record. In view of the nature of the
judicial review now provided by Section 154-73 of the General Code,
as amended in 1951, it is expecting too much from the layman com-
posing such authorities, untrained in law, to properly or correctly
detexmine questions of evidence or law.' 0 Section 6064-4 of the
9 OHio GEN. CODE § 76-6 (5) provides that "the Bureau of Code Revision shall
organize and index all the rules of agencies as described in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act which have been filed in the office of the Secretary of State in compliance
with Sections 154-64 and 154-65 of the General Code." The Section further provides
that the bureau should publish these rules in such form as it sees fit and maintain
current supplements. Up to this time, however, the legislature has made no appro-
priations enabling the bureau to comply with this mandate. Although the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act in Section 154-66 creates a similar duty on each agency "to
compile currently, publish, and at all times have available for distribution in book
or pamphlet form ... all rules of general and uniform operation promulgated by it,"
there is no sanction attached to this requirement, such as rendering the rules in-
effective unless published. [Ed. note.]
10 CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 11502 provides that hearing officers shall have been
admitted to practice law in that state for at least five years prior to their appointment.
For a presentation of the arguments that many of the exclusionary rules of
[Vol. 13
LIQUOR CONTROL PROCEDURE
General Code, creating the Board of Liquor Control does not pro-
vide or require that the members of the board have any legal training
or experience. Oftentimes the chairman of the board, who conducts
its public hearings, will be a layman with no experience or training in
passing upon the competency, relevancy, or admissibility of testi-
mony and evidence as well as on questions of law. The record so made,
of course, is subject to judicial review and in many instances results
in needless appeals to the court of common pleas to secure administra-
tive fair play and justice. Quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Board of
Liquor Control, should have at least two members of the board who
have been admitted to the practice of law and who have had at least
five years legal experience. The hearings of the board should be
conducted by one of the lawyer members of the board, who should
pass upon all questions of evidence and law.
RIGIT OF APPEAL
At the present time, neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor
the Ohio Liquor Control Act" require the Board of Liquor Control in
appeal and citation cases to make specific findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in support of its orders. Repeatedly, the issuing author-
ity in rejecting an application for a permit will give many reasons
for the rejection, and upon the hearing of the appeal before the board
the evidence will fail to support but one of the many reasons given for
the rejection. Likewise, a citation to show cause why a permit should
not be revoked may charge many violations by the licensee, and upon
the hearing before the board the evidence will fail to support all of*
the charges. Nevertheless, the order of the board affirming the rejection
of an application for a permit or the order suspending or revoking a
permit will embody all of the reasons given for the rejection of the
application as well as all of the charges contained in the citation. When
an appeal is taken to the court of common pleas, the aggrieved ap-
plicant or permit holder is required to assume the unnecessary and
burdensome task of sifting the chaff from the wheat. There is no good
reason why the order of the Board of Liquor Control, either in an
appeal or citation case, should not recite specifically the findings of
fact established by the evidence and upon which the order of the
board is based. There is nothing in the law to prevent the board from
making such orders now; however, until the Act is amended, the board
like other comparable administrative authorities, will not do so. Such
an amendment to the Act would prevent many needless appeals to
evidence are inapplicable for administrative proceedings, see DAVIS, ADINISTRATIVE
LAW §§ 140 et seq. (1951); Cf. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 9 (1946).
11 Omo GEN. CODE § 6064-1 et seq.
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and expedite the appeals that are taken to the common pleas court.' 2
There are approximately 200 different types of licenses issued by
the state. Some 120 are issued for a term of one year, some 56 for an
indefinite term, ten are for more than one year, and two are for less
than one year. Permits issued by the Department of Liquor Control
are for one year. Many times in so-called citation cases, a permit holder
is cited to show cause shortly before or after his permit expires. Often-
times the Board of Liquor Control will hold the hearing in such case
and render a decision after the permit has expired. In some cases the
board will find that the charges alleged in the citation are well taken
and that the permit should be revoked, but, because the permit has
expired the board will issue an order reading thusly:
The board being unable to issue a revocation order which
in its opinion is warranted by the said violations, the same
therefore is moot.
The Court of Appeals of Franklin county, in a recent case, 13 held
that such an order was not appealable to or reviewable by the court
of common pleas under the Administrative Procedure Act because such
an order was not a final order. There is no express language in
Section 154-73 of the General Code which provides that the order
appealed from must be a final order as that term is commonly under-
stood, or as the term is defined in Section 12223-2 of the General
Code, pertaining to appeals under the Appellate Procedure Act.14
The word "appeal" as used in the Administrative Procedure Act is
defined in Section 154-62 of the General Code. The definition of the
word "appeal" includes and specifically refers to the reviewability of
a finding made by an administrative adjudicatory agency. In fact,
Section 154-73 of the General Code provides that a person adversely
affected by any order of an administrative agency pertaining to a
permit, may appeal to the court of common pleas. A so-called moot
case order made by the Board of Liquor Control in and of itself
adversely affects a permit holder since the order is tantamount to an
order of revocation, the only difference being that no actual penalty
is imposed by the board because the permit has expired. The decision
of the court of appeals if upheld will effectively deny the right of
appeal granted to an aggrieved permit holder by Section 154-73 of
the General Code.
The enactment of the Act was not intended to establish judicial
review of administrative orders measured by the same standard of
finally fixed by the Appellate Procedure Act. If such were the intention
12 MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar § 11 (1946).
13 Corn v. Board of Liquor Control (Ct. App. Franklin County, May 26, 1952).
14 OHIO GEN. CODE § 12223-1 et seq.
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of the legislature, it could have incorporated the language of Section
12223-2 of the General Code directly or by reference in Section 154-73
of the General Code. The fact that the legislature did not do so should
be proof enough that the appealability of an administrative order is
to be governed solely by the expressed language of Section 154-73 and
the definition of the word "appeal" in Section 154-62 of General Code.
If the ruling of the court of appeals is upheld by the supreme
court, then it will be within the power of any licensing agency and
administrative adjudicatory body, where the term of a permit is for
a year or shorter duration, to deny an aggrieved permit holder the
right of appeal provided by the Act. Such denial can be accomplished
by citing a permit holder to appear before an administrative adjudica-
tory body, such as the Board of Liquor Control, before the permit
expires and then holding a hearing after the permit has expired and
issuing an order reciting that, if the permit had not expired, it would
have been revoked for cause. If such be the law, then the Act should
be amended to avoid such a crass consequence. Since the board con-
trols its own docket, by its refusal to hear a case until after a permit
has expired, it can effectively deny that which the legislature intended
to give to a permit holder-the right to judicial review.
If a moot case order of an administrative adjudicatory body does
not support an appeal because it is not a final order, even though it is
an order issued by an administrative agency and adversely affect-
ing a person, then the judicial review provided by Section 154-73 of the
General Code provides for an idle thing and ceremony, since in most
cases both an administrative and judicial review cannot be obtained
during the term of a license which is of the short duration of a year
or less.
The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act was intended
to give and does give every one in Ohio whose profession, trade, or
business is controlled or regulated by means of a license by state ad-
ministrative authority, an opportunity to secure justice and fair play
through the medium of an administrative hearing, which in turn is
subject to judicial review. The Act created new private rights, one
of which is the right of judicial review. To deny that right by adminis-
trative delay would nullify the aim and purpose of the legislature in
utilizing administrative hearing and judicial review as a means of
protecting the interests and rights of applicants for licenses and
licensees.
The doctrine of moot case is increasingly being asserted by
administrative authorities as their defense for non-compliance with
orders made by administrative adjudicatory bodies and courts in
favor of persons who have been successful in appeals perfected under
the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Ohio courts apply the doc-
trine of moot case in litigation involving short term licenses then the
1952]
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administrative and judicial review provided by the Act will be meaning-
less, since it must be borne in mind that the commencement of pro-
ceedings to hear appeals from orders rejecting applications for permits,
as well as proceedings to revoke permits, is within the sole power of
the administrative agencies. Courts outside of Ohio have refused to
apply the doctrine of moot case to reviews of administrative orders
pertaining to licenses. The leading modern case is that of Burke v.
Coleman.15 The defense of the doctrine of moot case by administrative
authority should not be permitted to deny the rights flowing from a
successful appeal obtained by an aggrieved person under the review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act which the legislature
enacted in its solicitude for persons who require state licenses in
order to engage in business, trades, or professions.
The right of administrative officers and boards to appeal to the
court of appeals from adverse decisions rendered by the court of
common pleas in appeals filed under Section 154-73 of the General
Code has been consistently questioned for some time. Recently, the
Court of Appeals of Franklin county in Barn Cafe R Restaurant, Inc.
v. Board of Liquor Control,'6 held that the Board of Liquor Control
and Department of Liquor Control have such right of appeal, even
though the court stated that there is no expressed provision in the
Act authorizing administrative authorities to appeal an adverse
judgment rendered by a court of common pleas. The court held that
it had jurisdiction of such an appeal because of the language in Sec-
tion 154-73 of the General Code which provides that the hearing of
the appeal in the court of common pleas from the administrative
order "shall proceed as in the trial of a civil action." On that basis
the court of appeals reasoned that all laws including the right of
appeal under the Appellate Procedure Act pertaining to the trial of
civil actions in the court of common pleas governed the review of an
administrative order relating to a license. The reasoning of the court
appears to be in conflict with what was said of the applicability of the
Appellate Procedure Act to cases involving administrative orders under
the Administrative Procedure Act by Judge Turner in Farrand v.
State Medical Board.1" The court of appeals overlooked the fact that
the legislature in the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
was concerned primarily with the welfare of licensees in their relation-
ships with state administrative authorities. The Act was not intended
to give such authorities -the right to appeal to higher reviewing courts
whenever dissatisfied with a determination made against an agency in
15 356 Mo. 598, 202 S.W. 2d 809 (1947); accord, Orozdowske v. Mayor, etc., 134
N.J.L. 566, 49 A. 2d 476 (1946); Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Com-
mission, 36 F. 2d 111, 66 A.L.R. 1355 (1929); see 42 Azt. JUa. 571.
16 63 Ohio L. Abs. 344, 109 N.E. 2d 332 (1951).
17 Note 4, supra.
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a license matter, either by administrative adjudicatory body or the
court of common pleas. The absence of enabling language in favor of
administrative authorities in Section 154-73 of the General Code is
not an accident or oversight when one compares that statute with the
Act recommended in 1942 by the Administrative Law Commission to
the 95th General Assembly, wherein it was provided that state ad-
ministrative agencies be allowed to appeal from orders rendered by
the proposed Administrative Board of Review to the Supreme Court
of Ohio.' s Whenever the legislature has determined to grant state
officers and agencies the right of appeal it has done so by expressed
language.19
There is no good reason or need from a governmental standpoint
why administrative authorities should have the right of appeal to a
higher reviewing court from an adverse decision of the court of
common pleas in a licensing matter. Outside of the very natural and
human desire to be upheld or vindicated in his or its action, an ad-
ministrative officer or authority cannot be affected, aggrieved, or
prejudiced by an adverse order or judgment rendered by a court of
common pleas in an appeal filed under Section 154-73 of the General
Code. On the other hand with the unlimited wealth, resources, and
power of the state, and no individual responsibility or liability for the
costs or for the expense of employing legal counsel, an administrative
authority with the right to appeal could engage in protracted and
costly litigation to the detriment of a successful applicant for a license
or licensee. The need for such a right of appeal on the part of adminis-
trative authorities vanishes when one remembers that the procedural
safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act were designed and
intended to protect the citizen against the tyranny of administrative
authorities empowered by law to issue, deny, suspend, and revoke
licenses necessary to engage in a business, trade, and profession.
An indication of the position that the Supreme Court of Ohio
may take on that question is to be found in the recent case of DeCillo
& Sons v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals. 2° The following is from
the syllabus of the case:
Neither a township board of zoning appeals nor any of its
members as such have a right of appeal from the judgment
of a court, rendered on appeal from a decision of such board
and reversing and vacating that decision.
In spite of its few shortcomings the Administrative Procedure Act
18 See S.B. No. 36, p. 16, 95th General Assembly, Regular Session (1943-1944).
'9 OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 1078-34a, 1084-9(o), 1346-4, 1345-1, 1465-90, 1182-13, 5611-2,
and 13459-14.
20 I58 Ohio $t. 302, 109 N.E. 2d 8 (1952).
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has been of untold benefit -to hundreds of thousands of citizens whose
livelihood and investments can be jeoparidized by arbitrary, unfair,
erroneous, and tyrannical actions of administrative authorities in the
issuance, rejection, suspension, or revocation of licenses, and who in
most instances act as accuser, prosecutor, and judge.
